2013 MLB Mid-season Predictions & Review: Trades and Winning

We've reached the All-Star break and some story lines have unfolded. Biogenesis. Yasiel Puig. Patrick Corbin. The Dodgers, the new Yankees. The Yankees, the new budget conscience Yankees. Young players doing big things...

The Boys of Summer are at it again.

So what's will happen here on out?

 Division Races

The usual trade deadline stuff has started to unfold. As the top teams have the joys of inspiring to be the best going to the playoffs, while the under .500 teams are looking for those coveted prospects for their best, high priced or 2014 free agents that can fill the holes on their competitors. Fans argue at MLB trade rumors over what is the fair market price for Matt Garza, or Bud Norris, or now, the Chase Headleys of the market.

The Yankees should be sellers. They have the oldest team in the MLB at 31.6 years, a year older than those Dodgers, a veteran ball club, that too felt the injury bug in the first half. Their once formidable stars are so long in the tooth - Jeter, A-Rod, Rivera - that rocking chairs are being built to honor them.The biggest difference: the Dodgers have gotten healthy, infused young talent (Puig), and almost have to be buyers in their division. LA has around $250 million until my 65th birthday to invest in a winner. None of their opponents can access those type of resources going forward.

Dodgers could buy another starter (dumping Capuano) and setup man (Brandon League) before the deadline in using their best prospects Joc Pederson, Corey Seager, Zach Lee or Ross Stripling to make their first trip to the World Series since Tommy LaSorda and Orel Hershiser were a Big 80's item. Who needs a minor league when you can buy or make high prices for talent (as they just did with A-Gone, Hanley, Crawford, Kemp, and Andre Ethier) or will Clayton Kershaw?

Arizona will fall behind enough but still will make the playoffs. First, I like Arizona's team on the field. They have talent and hustle and are a team that competes. They are the antithesis of LA's spend it like a Lone Ranger film no one will watch designs. Which is part of their problem: they are nearly locked into $80 million all ready for next season, from there $86 million payroll in 2013. I can't see them adding significant payroll (even this season) unless they receive a good deal with it.

Meanwhile, they have a deep farm system with good top pitching prospects - LHP Tyler Skaggs and RHP Archie Bradley - to go with 3B Matt Davidson,  RHP Braden Shipley, SS Nick Ahmed and  SS Chris Owings. Figure they will hit big 1-3 more times like they did on Didi Gregorious and Patrick Corbin, and by 2015, they have the makings of a young group that will give LA fits but at 45-50% of the cost ($105-100 million).

But this year, they can add a bullpen arm and hope 1B Paul Goldschmidt can do a Chris Davis impersonation for the 2nd half. (Which is to say, Goldie's been good, but can he be video game good?)

Both Chicago teams are sell, sell, sell. Not unusual. Except that the White Sox have higher payroll, but less market appeal.  Both are doing a rebuild, once again. White Sox, it seemingly always piece meal. The Cubs, have two models they are working on:

 These two models are in play for all 30 teams. As fans we focus on how to win championships through trades, development, microsabermetrics/macrosabermetrics, and field management theory with players that can and do things that can either upset, or regress the path a team is on, or provide that boost to the model.

The financial model is a different story; but linked. Getting $500 million in renovations approved will produce a different Wrigley Field, and hopefully, a different atmosphere while keeping the face of the ballpark, but improving the structural problems, the team facilities, and the media and advertising dollars that teams are always in the market for more of. (Ask the Dodgers.)

Detroit, Boston, Oakland, Tampa Bay, and Texas seem like the cream of the American League. Detroit only has to play to their payroll - to beat Cleveland. They have a solid offense and top pitching right now down to their 5th starter- their problems are bullpen, after 7 innings. Cleveland has the same issue; so which one decides first and actually solves that, could be able to do it. (I don't see them getting the 2nd wild card spot.)

Oakland and Texas. Texas has the cash and the prospects. Oakland has $60 million payroll, Billy Beane and a philosophy. Both could be hurt by the Biogenesis performance enhancer fallout, if appeals are quick and timed wrong. Texas has an easier time solving their problems, but Oakland will search for a cheap OF solution - dumping CF Chris Young's contract to clear a roster spot, and shooting for another outfielder that fits their price, and talent expectations.

The Cubs might be enticed if they were offered catcher Bruce Maxwell, a pitcher with usual flaws/but upside with Young for Nate Schierholtz and David DeJesus. Scheirholtz is a corner and DeJesus played in Oakland. Both are cheap and under control while Young is on a club option, Oakland probably will not execute. Oakland likely has other ideas on how to get some offense cheap. Their pitching is in good shape until Bartolo Colon is blown up by Biogenesis. This will play out later this month.

Texas is a better Cub partner with more cards. Their need for outfield help could be more dire. But Texas might even entertain the White Sox's Alex Rios for a bat.

Boston, Baltimore, and the Rays. Each have pretty solid lineups, Rays the better upper end pitching, Boston the cash to solve a few problems (and they started), and the Rays are much like the A's, moneyball and prospects.

This race goes down to the last two weeks, and will depend on injuries, I think. Health determines what you can do until minor league call ups in September. Boston and Tampa have top talent they are willing to part with if the addition is a right fit. Baltimore has pitching prospects they won't part with - Dylan Bundy - but can't use either now. Baltimore has to hope Chris Davis is going for 60 and they made a solid addition of Feldman for 7-8 victories and long outings.

Atlanta gets to the playoffs. Phillies sell off - Cliff Lee keeps on being bantered for an option. (And the Phillies want Arizona or Texas to come knocking...)

Pittsburgh and St. Louis go to the postseason. Pittsburgh needs this. A feel-good story as GM Neal Huntington remembers vividly working for the 1995 Montreal Expos after their last gasp at success.

Pirates have allowed the least runs in baseball with the Cardinals right behind them. Pittsburgh has a below average offense, needing a bat at premier shortstop (Barmes) or right field (Snider) with both having a sub-.300 OBP and -.4 WAR between them. 1B Garrett Jones is doing little just enough to keep a job. So they, got a platoon going with Gaby Sanchez.

What works? Outfielders are plentiful for the right ask. Shortstops are too tight a market - and Jody Mercer has taken over for Barmes.They called up Jose Tabata to solve some outfield offensive woes.

I give them a 50% or better shot, but they need to take a shot at adding a real offensive potential. But finances are always a concern.

Cincinnati is a dark horse. And so, it will too come down to health for them and the NL Central.

Playoffs:

NL: Atlanta, St. Louis, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh (WC), Arizona (WC)
AL: Boston, Detroit, Texas, Oakland (WC), Tampa (WC)

AL Championship series: Boston vs. Texas
NL Championship series: Los Angeles vs. Arizona

World Series: Los Angeles vs. Boston
Los Angeles in 7 games.

But, will see.

MLB Franchise Success: A breakdown of a few ideas

Before I go into my diatribe, two friendly bloggers to tag:

Another Maria

Dwacon - http://dwacon.blogspot.com (post kept screwing up)

MLB Baseball has various objectives:

1. Revenues/profits
2. Home Attendance
3. Championships
4. Winning Regular Season Games

One of the best tools to determining a correlation is coefficient of determination.or R-sq. This number is extremely useful in determining the close correlation between two variables. A number above .9 is excellent. .75 is very good. .55 and above is adequate to good. and anything above .4 can reflect a moderate correlation. Zero to .15 correlation shows little or no reflection of a match.

Revenues to Home Attendance (1998-2005): R-sq= .596. This is a adequate to good correlation between these factors. It is no surprise given more people equal more revenues. Factors such as Team marketing, Publicity and TV contracts would (or should) strengthen this, but data is unavailable for that.

Championships to Winning Regular Season Games: It takes regular season wins to go on to the playoffs. There, it is chance and chance alone (Billy Beane's comment: "My shit does not work in the playoffs,") reflects that. Yet, the Ability to win games is tied to Run Differential (R-sq: .97).

Runs Scored: Requires two factors: OBP% and SLG%. On Base % is nearly three times as important as Slugging Average. R-sq is greater than .9, reflects an importance in these factors.

Stolen Bases have nearly zero correlation. The best analysis of a excellent running team(s) - the 1980's St. Louis Cardinals - shows that they generated only 10-12% of total runs scored via the Stolen Base. Without a success rate of 75% or greater, the value is minimal or negative.

Runs Allowed:The biggest breakthrough came when Voros McCracken devised two new metrics:

BABIP and DIPS.

Batted Average on Balls in Play are tied mostly to the fielder's ability to catch the baseball in play. A pitcher, though partly responsible for these hits (line drives, grounders, flies), can not position or improve his fielder's natural ability to succeed. If scouting the other team's hitters and pitch-to-pitch placement succeed then this average will likely go down. If this value is low and DIPS is favorable, then a Pitcher's ERA will likely be lower.

It turns out 4 factors have a great deal to do with a pitcher's success (DIPS) independent what his fielders can do (BABIP.)

• High Strikeouts ( less balls to field, easier to play defense)
• Low Walks (less runners, less opportunities to score, less disruption of pitcher and fielders)
• Low Home Runs (Or solo shots, these are guaranteed runs)
• Less Hit Batters (tied to walks - but it could be used as a tool to deter)

With these two factors, R-sq can be as high as .77. JC Bradbury, The Baseball Economist, 2007, pg 171.

The biggest ways a team improves are through:

• Trades
• Drafting
• Free agency

It takes talented GMs, Managers, Scouting and Stat Gurus to accomplish the goal of assembling good to great talent.

Much of this concept can be explain in this excerpt from my work in progress project Bringin' Gas and Dialin' 9:

As a primer to this subject (since it included much of Bill James’ astute statistical analysis) is that much of the actual premise behind Michael Lewis’s research and writing in Moneyball was that the Oakland Athletics of the late 1990’s and early 21st century utilized this statistical knowledge to build their teams judiciously (and frugally) in the high stakes baseball scouting market that reflected a higher regard for speed for speed sake, the rare 5-tool players (Batting for Average, for Power, Speed, Arm and Fielding Excellence) and drafting younger players out of high school that were somewhat difficult to project 5-7 years later.

Whereas, Oakland, spent more time looking at key statistics to find unusual selections in their drafts, utilized low cost free agents that still retained either a power component or on-base component that could also fit piece meal into their lineups because they had also lost players due to high salary demands (such as Jason Giambi moving over to the Yankees after winning the AL MVP, Johnny Damon to the Red Sox, or All-Star shortstop Miguel Tejada to Baltimore) and also drafted college pitchers that could immediately be used at the major league level because they met defense independent pitching statistics (DIPS) criterion, such as Rookie of the Year closer Huston Street in 2005.

As Paul Caron and Rafael Gely reflect in a similar vein in a 2004 Texas Law Review article comparing the legal education ratings of law schools and Major League Baseball:
“Moneyball paints an intriguing portrait of how Billy Beane’s “superior management” allowed the Oakland A’s not only to compete with, but also to prevail over, teams with double or even triple the resources. Beane realized that Major League Baseball was rife with inefficiencies that he could exploit. These inefficiencies derived from baseball’s reliance on subjective evaluation of players by scouts, as well as objective evaluation using conventional Triple Crown statistics, to measure players’ contributions to a team’s success. Beane disdained the view that you could evaluate players by watching them play and instead tapped into an alternative body of statistical data to more accurately value players that other teams either under-or over-valued using the traditional measures. In the case of hitters, Beane displaced the traditional Triple Crown statistics (batting average, home runs, and RBIs) with “OPS,” which combines a player’s on-base percentage (“OBP”) and slugging percentage (“SLG”) in measuring his offensive value to a team. In the case of pitchers, Beane discarded two of the three Triple Crown statistics (wins and ERA) in favor of “DIPS,” defense independent pitching statistics, which attempt to strip away the effect of a team’s defense on a pitcher’s performance by focusing on those statistics exclusively within a pitcher’s control: walks, home runs, and strikeouts.

Interestingly, these alternative statistical methods did not arise from within Major League Baseball itself. Instead, Lewis traces the lineage of these new ways to evaluate players to Bill James, at the time a night watchman in a pork and beans factory. In 1977, James self-published a sixty-eight-page book that turned into an annual “abstract” that looked at player performance through new statistical lenses.”[1]

With Bill James’ innovative insight, two decades later, the Oakland A’s were beating the long odds that most teams faced having 1/3 to 2/5 of the financial wherewithal as the Yankees had, but winning nearly the same amount of games in the regular season. But this fact was only brought to a greater public light with the publishing of Moneyball.

Once again, in Moneyball, Michael Lewis reports that Bill James also stated, “college players are a better investment than high school players by a huge, huge, laughably huge margin.”[2] And the Oakland Athletics have pursue this particular motto due to ownership constraints on signing bonuses in the picking of their top players and their firm beliefs in their drafting practices. They have gotten immediate returns on college players, such as Joe Blanton, Nick Swisher and Huston Street; which is exactly the formula they look to compete with for years to come. Primarily, they [the Oakland A’s] have utilized hard and real statistical analysis and college performance versus gut feel or sensed potential.[3]

In quoting Michael Lewis, [Paul Caron and Rafael Gely] in a 2004 Texas Law Review address the Legal Profession’s similarities to this Moneyball analysis in referencing, “ ‘Everywhere one turned in competitive markets, technology was offering the people who understood it an edge. What was happening to capitalism should have happen to baseball: the technical man with his analytical magic should have risen to prominence in baseball management, just as he was rising to prominence on, say, Wall Street.’ But real general managers, as contrasted with their fantasy counterparts, obdurately refuse to embrace the statistical measures of players’ contributions to teams’ success and thus create enormous inefficiencies in the Major League Baseball market for players.”[4] This is very nearly the Core Mantra of the Beane Philosophy: Exploit inefficiencies in evaluation of players through statistical analysis, utilize certain predictive measures (such as OBP*SLG 90%+ correlation to Runs Scored) and price it according to (and favorably against) the existent market forces in MLB.
[1] Caron, PL, Gely R. What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics. Texas Law Review Vol. 82 (1483). 2004. 1491.

[2] Lewis M. Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game. New York: W.W. Norton & Company; 2004. 99.
[3] http://www.protrade.com/. 2002 'Moneyball' Draft Revisited.http://www.mlb.com/; 2006 June 6.
[4] Caron, PL, Gely R. What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics. Texas Law Review Vol. 82 (1483); 2004.1493-1944.